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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
CLA l TD]1~

Dl~:~NI~~

]Jfaiutiff & llespondent,
vs.
THJ~ Dl~N\'"l~H & RIO <JR.ANDE
\\TJ~:STJ1~R~
RAILROAD COM-

No. 9543

p AXY, a corporation,

Defendant & Ap]Jellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

PRELlnlL~AR1~ STATE~IENT

The parties "\\rill bP refPrred to as in the court belo"'..·
All italics are ours.
SrfA~~E~IENT

()F FACTS

Plaintiff deems it necessary to restate the facts for
the reason that defendant has not stated the facts as
they 1nust be vie"\\Ted on app·eal, favorable to respondent.
Plaintiff brought the suit in question against defendant for damages resulting fron1 the loss of two fingers
on his left hand as a result of frostbite suffered on
the night of January ;2 and 3 of 1960, ·w·hile working
on defendant's mainline track, approximately 16 miles
"Test of Green River, Utah. Plaintiff complained that
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defendant was negligent in causing him to become overexposed to the unusually cold and freezing weather
over an unnecessarily and danger,ously long period of
time without adequate warming facilities. (R 1-3)
The track maintenance crew of which plaintiff was
a member was called out on a Saturday night, January
2, 1960, to repair an open joint. The cre'v consisted
of the foreman, plus three laborers, one of 'vhom "~as
the plaintiff. (R 93) There was another man by the
name of Delmar H. Powell, who frequently worked on
the crew who was not present at the time in question.
(R 93) There was another track 1naintenance crew "~hich
worked out of Cedar. As a matter of fact, the open
joint in question \vas slightly in the territory of the
Cedar crew. (R 92, 96)
A joint is the place

"~here

two lengths of rail are

attached end to end, the rails in the area in question
being 39 feet in length. At the joint the attachment
is made by the use of t'vo angle bars, one on each
side of the rail, through 'vhich are t"To holes on either
side of the joint, with bolts and tightening nuts. An
open joint such as the one in question is caused by
the contracting of the rails in extre1nely cold \Yeather
to the point 'vhere t'vo bolts on one side of the joint
are sheared, thus causing the rails to be

~Pparated

so1ne

distance. ( R 96-99) The rails of the open joint in question "rere a ppToxiina tely one and three quarters of an
inch apart. (R-99)
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'1_1hp
~i~t~

\York involved in repairing an open joint con-

in loosening the nuts on the bolts at each joint,

continuing fron1 tlLP open joint for approxiinately nine
joint~

in Paeh di reetion. After the nuts are

(•lti~el i~
pu~h
~o

the

that.

used to
rail~

TIP\\.

pr~·

loo~ened,

a

at tlH) particular joint in order to

at the open joint close enough together

bolts and nuts can be used at the phH'P " . .here

they have been broken. (R. 105-108) For the purpose of
loosening the
length is
a

u~Pd.

re~e~~ed

nut~,

a "'rench approxin1ately -! feet in

T·he head end of the bolt fits snugly into

part of thP angle iron and therefore the nuts

ean be tightened or loosened by using the wrench.
The ere"\\: Inet at the toolhouse "·est of the depot in
Green River at approximately 5:00 P.ni. At that ti1ne
the \veather \vas described as "awful cold," (R. 94) the
\veather report sho"\\ ing a te1nperature of 10° F. (Exhibit 3-P) The plaintiff ,~lore what he thought to be
adequately "·a.rn1 clothing, consisting of heavy under""ear, a levi-type of ""aist overalls, heavy shirt, and
heavy jacket, sheepskin coat, heavy socks, \vork shoes,
and t\YO pair of gloves, an inner glove described as
canvas gloves, \Yith a flannel material on the inside,
and an outer glove described as rubberized canvas. (R
9-±, 95) Plaintiff .had dressed sin1ilarly to this on the
joh on prior occasions. (R 94, 154) Plaintiff was not
"rearing overshoes. ( R 9-t, 95)
7

The ere"· was taken in a truck to :Jiilepost 571,
\\·here it " . .as 1net by the signal 1naintainer, Bud ernz.

''T
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vV ernz took the cre\v \vith hiu1 on a motorcar to ~ho'v
them the open joint approxirnately % of a 1nile a\\·ay.
As soon as the crew was s.hown the open joint in que~
tion, they inserted a "Dutchman," so that the track
could be used and gone over by trains while the work
was going on. A "Dutchman" is a good temporary
n1easure that is used for this purpose. (R 101, 118) It
eonsists of a small piece of rail, the pieces having
been p·recut in various sizes. The angle bars are taken
off, the "Dutchman" inserted, and then the angle bars
replaced, tightening the nuts on the bolts on one side
of the joint. With the "Dutchman'' so inserted, trains
can be slo,ved down and taken across the joint being
repaired.
Plaintiff testified that a ~'Dutchman" is a safe
temporary measure and could have been used as it was
on the night in question, with merely one man at the
site so that the crew could have been brought out during
daylight the next morning to complete the job in 4
hours instead of the 10 to 12 hours that it took on the
night in (1uestion. (R 119, 120) There "~as evidence
that it 'vas practical to issue a train order so that
trains con1ing over "rould' know \Yhere to slo\v down.
(R 1:21)

Plaintiff also testified that by utilizing an

extra cre\v the time could be cut do\\11 from -± hours
to :2 hours to do the job; and that an extra erew working at night in conjunction \vith the crew on which he
\vas \vorking, could have done the job in-! hours. (R 1:20,

121)
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..:\s soon as the '" Dutclnnan'' \Vas inserted, plaintiff
\\'a:-; sent back to the truck, \\·hich was left near l\Iilepost
rl71, the truckdriver having gone back prior to that \\"ith
the signal 1naintainer on his motorcar. The plaintiff
had to walk back through 8 to 10 inches of sno\\\
approxi1nately 300 yards to the high\vay to n1e-et the
truck. ( 1{ 102) In the back of the truck t~he cre\Y had
brought a railroad tie \\·hich ".,.as used as soon as the
truc.k arrived to build a fire. A fire \\·as built and
used but did not produce 1nuch heat, for the reason
that the \\"ind \\·as blo,ving fro1n the \\·est through the
cut in "·hieh the open joint \vas located. (R 105)
11 he "\vork was done by

~

or 3 men \vorking at a
joint one holding the lamp and another using the wrench
to loosen tJ1e nuts, and the foreman supervising. ( R 106110) Plaintiff testified that it V."as cold; that using hi:-;
hands on the cold tools also contributed to the coldness
of his hands; that the \vork continued with occasionally
a man's being able to go back to the fire to attempt
to keep ,,·arm, and occasionaly \vhen a train would co1ne
by, the entire cre\\T \vould be back at the fire. Plaintiff
testified that later on another fire \\"as built. (R 110)
Plaintiff testified that at approximately midnight he
noticed that he had to pry his fingers on the left hand
fron1 their grip on the wrench and commented about
this to the foreman (R 109); that they continued their
\Vork; that later on the battery on the light grew weak;
and that the lights on the truck 'vere used to help light
the area. Plaintiff testified that he \\'"as in the truck
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at the end of the shift for not more than a half hour.
(R 143, 1-1:4) The job was finished at approximately
4- :00 A.~{., and the crew "\Vas taken back to Green River,
arriving at approximately 5:00 A.M. (R 111) During
the time the crew was on the job there were approximately three trains, two passenger and one freight,
which came across the joint. (R 146, 1-1:7) At the time
that plaintiff first noticed his fingers having to be
pried from the tool, he noticed a tingling ·sensation;
and later, after arriving home that morning, the tingling,
burning, and discoloration. He went to see the doctor
that same morning after sleeping and received some
Inedication. Later he was sent to Dr. Hubbard in Price
and was hospitalized. Eventually his little finger "\vas
re1noved at approximately the first joint from the
knuckle and the ring finger, right at the knuckle. (R 11111-l:)

In 1938 plaintiff had lost the middle finger of the
left hand due to infection. (R 115) Plaintiff testified
that during the years fron1 1938 to 1960 he had been
able to successfully perfor1n his \York as a section
laborer; that he could get a satisfactory grip on his
tools; but that since losing the other t\YO fingers fro1n
the incident in question, he had difficulty grasping tools
and particularly in using tie tongs and a 'vheelharro\v.
Plaintiff returned to \York on July 15, 1960, \Yith lost
\\·ages of approxi1nately $2,132.00. (R 118)
Dr. Reed Clegg testified that as a result of the loss
of the t\\To fingers the plaintiff is suffering from a
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disability of the hand function 25 per cent greater than
the prior existing disability. (159, 163) He also testified
that with body temperature being reduced, a person'~
extremities are more easily subject to frostbite; and
therefore a person having cold feet is more easily subjected to frostbite in his fingers and hands. (R 165)
The fore1nan, ,J. G. Chronopolous, testified he noticed
"~hen the cre\Y first met at 5:00 P.~f. that Dennis did
not have over~hoes on and that he did not think he
'va~ \\"armJ~~ enough dressed. He did nothing about it.
(R 196)
The jury returned a verdict in the gross arnount of
$20,000.00 and reduced it by $10,000.00 for contributory
negligence on the part of plaintiff, leaving a net verdict
of $10,000.00. Defendant made a motion for judgment
not\\·ithstanding the verdict and a motion for a ne"\v
trial. (R 73-75) Defendant made no complaint in either
of said 1notions concerning the amount of damages
a"·arded by· the jury.
ARGU~1ENT

POINT I
THIS IS A PROPER CASE FOR THE JURY
ROGERS
~ince the la\Y involved is Federal, the opinions of

the l.,.nited States Supreme Court are controlling. Prior
to 1957 the Supre1ne Court zealously guarded the right
to a jury trial. See wnke1·son r. McCarthy, 336 U.S.
5~, 69 S.Ct. -!-13, -t-18, 93 L.Ed. -±97; Lavender v. Ktttru,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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327 U.S. 645, 66 S.Ct. 740, 90 L.Ed. 916; Ellis t:. Union
Pacific RR. Co., 148 Neb. 515, 27 N.W. 2d 921, 329 lT.S.
649, 67 S.Ct. 598, 91 I..~.E~d. 572; Lillie v. Thrnnpson
( 1947), 332 U.S. 459, 68 S. Ct. 140, 92 L. Ed. 73. In 1957
the United States Supreme Court handed down opinions
in three FELA cases which set the course for the future~
The Court in these cases set a sharp trend toward even
greater liberality in guarding the right of a jury trial
for claimants under FJ~JLA. Since then the Court has
guarded this right by granting petitions for certiorari
and reversing cases "\vhere a jury trial has been denied.
The 1957 cases are: Rogers v. Misso1tri Pacific RR.
()o., 352 lT.S. 500, 77 S.Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed. 2d 493, TVebb
v. Illinois Central RR. Co., 352 U.S. 512, 77 S.Ct. 451,
1 L.Ed. 2d 503; and Jlerguson v. Moore-McCormack
LiHes, I uc., 352 lT.S. 5~1~ 77 S.Ct. 457, 459 L.Ed. 2d 511.
In the Rogers case the plaintiff had been given
the task of burning off ''reeds and vegetation near
defendant's tracks. ln addition, he "'as given the duty
of watching for hot boxes on passing trains. ,,. .hile
perforining the burning \York, he \Yas \Yatching for hot
boxes on a passing train, \\~hen it fanned the flames,
causing hin1 to beeon1e suddenl~T enveloped in flames
and ~nnoke, to retreat and fall fron1 the top of a culvert.
J udgn1ent on a jury verdiet \Yas revPrsed by the l\lissouri
Hupren1e Court for the rPason that petitioner's O"\\rn
conduct \\'as the sole proxin1ate eau~e of the 1nishap.
The eourt reversP<t holding that a jur~T question \Yas
prPsented b~· the evidence. J u~tice Brennan stated at
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page 44S:
'•lTnder this statute the test of a jury case
is simply whether the proofs justify with reason
the conelusion that employer negligence played
any part, even the slighte,-.d, in pToducing the injur~T or death for \vhich da1nages are sought. It
does not 1natter that, fron1 the evidence, the jury
1nay also "Tith reason, on grounds of probability,
attribute the result to otht·r causes, including the
en1ployee 's contributory negligence. Judicial ap. .
praisal of the proofs to determine "Thether a jury
question is presented is narro\Yly limited to the
single inquiry \Yhether, with reason, the conclusion
1nay he dra\\Tn that negligence of the employer
played any part at all in the injury or death.
Judges are to fix their sights primarily to n1ake
that appraisal and, if that test is met, are bound
to find that a case for the jury is made out
\\Thether or not the evidence allo\vs the jury a
choice of other probabilities. 'The statute express}~~ imposes liability upon the employer to pay
damages for injury or death due ' in whole or in
part' to its negligence . . . The burden of the
employee is met, and the obligation of the enlployer to pay damages arises, when there is p,roof,
even though entirely circumstantial, from \Vhich
the jury may with reason make that inference.
~'The

Congress \vhen adopting the law was
particularly concerned that the issues whether
there \vas employer fault and \vhether that fault
played any part in the injury or death of the employee should be decided by the jury whenever
fair-minded men could reach these conclusions
on the evidence . . .
•' Cognizant of the duty to effectuate the intention of the C'ongress to secure the right to a
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jury determination, this Court is vigilant to exercise its po,ver of revie'v in any case 'vhere it
appears that the litigants have been improperly
deprived of that deter1nination...
"The kind of misconception evidenced in the
opinion belo,v, 'vhich fails to take into account the
special features of this statutory negligence action
that make it significantly different from the ordinary common-law negligence action, has required
this Court to revie\v a nun1ber of cases. In a relatively large percentage of the ca~es revie\\~ed, the
Court has found that lo\ver courts have not given
proper scope to this integral part of the Congre~
sional scheme. We reach the sa1ne conclusion in
this case. The decisions of this Court after the
1939 amendments teach that the ·Congress vested
the power of decision in these actions exclusively
in the jury in all but the infrequent cases \\~here
fair-minded jurors cannot honestly differ 'vhether
fault of the employer played any part in the employee's injury. Special and important reasons
for the grant of certiorari in these cases are certainly present \vhen lo,ver federal and state courts
persistently deprive litigants of their right to a
jury determination."
The Webb case involved injuries received by plaintiff in a fall on a cinder roadbed, 15 feet fro1n the housetrack s "~itch. He \\ras alongside the track co1mecting to
the s\\·iteh and ~lipped on an unnoticed, partially covered
cinder about the ~ize of his fist," e1nbed'ded in the level
but soft roadb(~d. It \Ya~ conceded that the clinker in the
roadbed creatPd a hazardous condition, giving rise to defendant's liabilit~~ under the act if the proof raised a jury
qne~tion of defendant'~ alleged negligence in permitting
H
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tlH· <·linker to be there. The l~ourt of Appeals vie\ved
t hP evidence as insufficient to raise a jury question be-

enusp the petitionpr did not adduce proof sho\\~ing \\'hat
standard procedures \\'ere follo,ved to prevent large clinkers fron1 being used in road ballast, and in inspPct ing
roadhPds for hazards to finn footing. The Supreine
Court reversed, holding that there \vas a jury question
raised h~T the evidence.
The Ferguson case \\Tas a suit under the Jones . Aet
"Thich applies FELA la\v. The suit \vas for injuries sustained h~T a ship's baker "~hen his hand slipped onto the
blade of a sharp butcherlmife "Thich he \\"as using to chip
hard ieP crean1. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reveT~Pd judg1nent for plaintiff, holding that defendant's n1otion for a directed verdict should have been
granted. The Supre1ne (~ourt granted certiorari and reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the opinion b:T ~lr. Justice Douglas.
Plaintiff at the time of his injury was a second
baker on respondent's passenger ship Brazil. At the tin1e
in question he \Yas filling an order for 12 portions of ice
crean1. \\Then he got half\\~ay do\Yn into a 2%-gallon ice
crea1n container, he found that the ice cream \vas so hard
that it could not be removed with the hemispherical scoov
\\Thich he had been furnished. He then undertook to relnove the ice cream \Yith a sharp butcherknife kept nearby, grasping the handle and chipping at the ·hard ice
erea1n. The knife struck a spot in the ice crea1n \\~hieh
\\?a:-: so hard that his hand slipped do\"\"'11 onto the blade of
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the knife, resulting in the loss of two fingers of his right
hand. The jury returned a verdict of $17,500.00. The
Court of Appeals, in reversing, held it was not ''Tithin
the realm of reasonable foreseeability that plaintiff 'vould
use the knife to chip the frozen ice cream. 'The Supreme
Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to take
to the jury the question of whether respondent "\Vas negligent in failing to furnish petitioner "\vith an adequate
tool with ":hich to perform his task. Petitioner had testified that the hard ice cream could have been loosened
safely with an ice chipper 'vhich he had used on other
ship~s. He was not, however, furnished 'vith such an
instrument. The court stated on page 458:

"On this record, fair-minded men could conclude that respondent should have foreseen that
petitioner might be tempted to use a knife to perform his task "\vith dispatch, since no adequate
implement was furnished him. . . . Since the
standard of liability under the Jones Act is that
established by Congress under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, -±5 U.S.C.A. ·§51, et seq.,
'vhat "Te said in Rogers v. llfissouri Pacific RR
Co., 352 lT.S. 500, 77 S.Ct. 443, is relevant here ... ''
A reading of the foregoing three cases 'vill show
conclusively that the U. S. Supre1ne Court "ill guard
the right of a jury trial in FELA cases, fir1nly believing
that to deprive railroad workers of the benefit of a jury
trial in close or doubtful eases is to take a"\vay a goodly
portion of thPir r<'lief "\vhich Congress has afforded them.
.:\1()1~1~~ (i(){:I.JD

H.A.'?E BEEN DONE RULE
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One of the rules \rhiclt haH been adopted to assist in
deter1nining \\·hether or not tl:ere is a ,jury q~iestion is the
rnle that, if n1nre could haec been done for the p1aintiff's
~afety, there is a jury question. 'l,his rule "·as establisehd
in the case of Bailey r. ( entral T'"erulont Raillcay. luc.,
(19-!3) 319 {T.S. 350, 63 S. l t. 1062, 87 L.Ed. 1~~~- This
\Yas a death action under FELA, the decedent having
been killed b~· a fall fro1n a bridge over a cattlepass, the
railroad tracks being about lt) feet above the ground. At
the tune in question, decedent \Vas working on a ere,,·
engaged in dun1ping cinders through the ties in the bridge
floor onto the road\vay belo"\\r. The only available footing
at the side of the car \vas about 1:2 inches \vide, of \vhich
8 or 9 inches \Yere taken up by a raised stringer.. There
\\~as no guardrail. The evidence showed that the cinders
\Yere in a hopper ~ar; that the doors in the floor could
be opened hy turning a nut at the side of the car in a
tightening manner until a dog was disengaged by another employee, at ,,·hich time the nut \vould spin, due to
the weight of the cinders on the doors. There \Yas evidence
that the deceased \\Tas unskilled and perhaps unfanliliar
w·ith the opening of hopper cars, no one having seen
him do this type of work before. It was also e,vident that
the hopper car could have been opened before it "\\.,.as
1noved onto t.he bridge, and any cinders \vhich spilled on
the road\\·a:· shoveled off onto the roadway beneath the
bridge; or, after the cinders had been dumped upon the
roadbed, a railroad tie could have been utilized as a drag
to push cinders from the roadbed to the ground belo\\.,. the
1

1

bridge. The Supreme Court of

,~ermont

reversed judg-
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n1ent for plaintiff, .holding that defendant's n1otion for
a directed verdict should have been granted, for the
reason that negligence \vas not shown. The li. S. Supreme
Court, in an opinion by ::\[r. J us6ce Douglas, rever~ed the
Supre1ne Court of ermont, holding that a jury question
was created hy the evidence. The court stated at page

'T

1064:
''The nature of the task "yhich Bailey tmdertook, the hazards which it entailed, the effort
which it required, the kind of footing he had, the
space in ":rhich he could stand, the absence of a
guard rail, the height of the bridge above the
ground, the fact that the car could have been opened or unloaded near the bridge on level groundall these were facts and circumstances for the jury
to \veigh and appraise in determining \vhether
respondent in furnishing Bailey \\ith that particular place in which to pe:rform the task \vas
negligent. The debatable quality of that issue,
the fact that fair-minded men might reach different conclusions, emphasize the appropriateness
of leaving the question to the jury. The jury is
the tribunal under our legal system to decide that
type of i~sue. (Tiller Y. Atlantic Coast Line R.
Co., ~upra) . . . To deprive these " ..orkers of the
benefit of a jury trial in close or doubtful cases
is to take a\\ya~: a goodly portion of the relief
\\'"hirh Congres~ has afforded them."
The above cas(l, in addition to setting forth the "more
could ,have been <lone" rule, instructs us that in determining \vhether or not the railroad has failed in its duty
to

furni~h

the plaintiff "yith a reasonably safe place to

\\'"Ork, all of the

ele1nent~

of the task should be considered
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and presented so that the jury can look at the job as a
'vhole to find out \vhether or not defendants had failed.
Follo\ving the Bailey case, the First Circuit applied
the reasoning BailP~~ in Boston & Maine RR v. BI eech,
( 19-Hi) 156 F .2d 109; certiorari denied October 28, 1946,
G7 ~. Ct. 124, 329 lJ.~. 763, 91 L.Ed. 658. The question
presented in this case \Vas whether or not there was
evidence sufficient to support the verdict for plain6ff
in a death action .....t\..t the time of the accident in question,
plaintiff "ras engaged in the work of stripping incoming
loco1notives. This 'vork consisted of removing ladders,
oilers, and s1nall tools from locomotives as they ca1ne in
off the road. It was done on a platform kno"\\rn as a
\\~ashstand, \\rhich consisted of two parallel wooden platforms about 100 feet long, 6 feet wide, and 5 or 6 inches
above ground level on either side of the track. The evidence showed that there was an overhang on locomotives of 15 inches. Decedent was on the washstand on
the side opposite to the engineer when a backing engine
hit hi1n and caused his death. The Circuit ·Court held
that there was n1ore than a scintilla of evidence to support the verdict, either on negligent operation of the locolnotive or failure to p-rovide decedent with a reasonably
safe place to 'york. As to the second count of negligence
the court stated at page 111:
'"The defendant might have painted lines on
the platform of its \Y'ashstand to indicate the
extent to \vhich locomotives overhang them, and
thus to warn persons on the platforms of the
danger incident to standing near their inner
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borders or it might even have set the platforms
of its washstand back from the tracks far enough
to prevent locomotives frorn overhanging them

at all.
"From the foregoing, it is clear that although
some precautions were taken for the decedent's
safety, ftttrther precaution.s trere possible, and
fro1n this it follows, as 've read the decisions cited
above, that there was an 'evidentiary basis' for
submitting the issue of the defendant's causal
negligence to the jury, and hence our 'function
is exhausted.' "
Another Supreme Court case which follo,ved in the
philosophy and fonn of Bailey was Blair v. Baltimore
& Oh,io RR Co. (1945), 323 U.S. 600, 65 S. Ct. 545,

546~

89 L.Ed. -t90. In that case, while three 'vorkmen were
attempting to 1nove a heavy steel pipe 'vith the aid of a
s1nall truck 2 feet high, the pipe slipped and t'Yo of the
workn1en released their holds, but petitioner did not.
The heavy· tube in
resulting in

~lipping

petitioner'~

Penns:Tlvania

rever~ed

ing petitionel' had

injury. The Supreme Court of

the judgment for p-etitioner, hold-

a~~tnned

negligence on the part of
Supren1P Court

caused the truck to kick back,

tliP

the risk, and there was no
defend·ant. On review, the

rever~Pd, ~tating

runong other things:

Ve think there is sufficient evidence to
sub1ni t to the jury the question of negligence
posed by thP co1nplaint. The duty of the en1ployer
heeon1es '1norP in1perative' as the risk increases.
. . . The negligence of the en1ployer may be deternl inPd b:T vie\\·ing its co uduct as a u·hole. . .
H

\
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and especially is this true in a case such as this,
'vhere the several ele1nents from which negligenct~
might be inferred are so closely inter\\'"OVen as
to fonn a single pattern, and where each imparts
character to the others.
'~rrhe

nature of the duty \\'"hich the petitioner
\Va~ conunanded to undertake, the dangers of moving a greasPd, 1000 lb. ste·el tube, 30 feet in length,
on a ;) foot truck, the area over which that truck
\\~as con1pelled to be Inoved, the suitableness of
the tools used in an extraordinary 1nanner to accoinplish a novel purpose, the number of men
assigned to assist him, their experience in such
\York and thPir ability to perform the duties and
the manner in \vhich they performed those duties
-all of those raised questions appropriate for a
jury to appraiS'e in considering ''"hether or not the
injury \\ras the result of negligence as alleged in
the co1nplaint. We cannot say as a matter of la\\'"
that the railroad complied with its duties in a
reasonably careful manner under the circumstances here, nor that the conduct which the jury
might have found to be negligent did not contribute to the petitioner's injury 'in whole or in part.'
(~onsequently \Ye think the jury, and not the court
~ hould finally determine these issues."

It

i~

submitted that the foregoing cases coming before Rogers, together 'vith the Rogers case, and its conlpanion case~, sho"'" that the Supreme Court has coinmanded that in such a case as tl1e case at bar, the entire
conduct of the railroad as a 'vhole should be considered
and presented to the jury; such as, the nature of the task
and ho'v it \\'"as performed, and coupled with this, \vhether
or not 1nore could have been done by the railroad to pro-
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teet its e1nployees. Pursuant to Rogers, if these ('Ollsiderations "justify \vith reason the conclusion that enlployer negligence played any part, even the sli.rJhtest, in
producing the injury," then a jury question is Inade out.
PO·ST ROGERS
Since Rogers, tlhe Supreme Court has, in nunterous
cases, granted certiorari and reversed \Yhere a jury
detern1ination has been denied. Also, lower courts
have follo\ved the mandate of Rogers. The follo\Ying are
examples of the militant attitude on the part of the
Supreme Court and other courts since Rogers in guarding this right to a jury trial.

Strickland v. Seaboard Air Line RR Co., (Fla.), 80
So.2d 914, 350 U.S. 893, 76 S. Ct. 157, 100 L.Ed. 786.
Plaintiff received injury while engaged in operation of
changing outside brakebeam weighing 118 pounds, assisted by three men on the outside of the car; necessary for
one man to be in a sitting or squatting p·osition underneath to disengage beam from belts; \Yhile plaintiff
doing this, slipped and fell hack against a s\vitchbox.
J£vidence "Tas produced that a pit could have been used
in \vhieh plaintiff rould have assumed a standing position and had a helper. There \Yas evidence that this \Yas
safer and easiPr~ although \Yitnesses did not state that it
\Vas unsafe to ehange the bean1 on a flat track. Also, there
\Vas evidence that it "~as cu~ton1ary to change the beam on
a flat track~ and defendant rould not get trains out on
tin1e if it had to use the pits. The lo\\Ter court held that
the evid<'n<·<~ \\·as insnffirient for a jury Yerdict, \Yhieh
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'vould have the effect of requiring the defendant to
change its operational polic~~ as to this operation, especially 'vhen plaintiff is seeking to hold defendant liable
for a cn8to1nary practice, of "·hieh neither he nor other
'vork1nen had ever contplained to defendant's officers.
On appeal the Supreme Court of the U.S. granted certiorari and reversed judgment, citing the Bailey case.

Daris v. Virgin~an Railway Co. (1960), 361 U.S. 35-1-,
80 S.Ct. 387, 4 L.Ed. 2d 366. Action for personal injuries
un<ler FELA, sustained by yard conductor who was
spotting various railway cars to loading platform on sp·ur
track of industrial plant and who had taken his position
on top of ears in order to assist the brakeman, and who
slipped "rhile descending ladder of boxcar. Trial judge
sustained n1otion for defendant to strike the, plaintiff's
evidence and discharge the jury. Virginia Sup·reme Court
affirmed. Plaintiff's first cause of action charged railroad with negligence in requiring the shifting of the cars
in such accelerated time and with such inexperienced' help
that petitioner was injured in attempting to carry out his
instructions. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari
and reversed, holding that the issue of negligence should
have been submitted to the jury. The evidence showed
that there were some 22 loaded cars to be spotted; that
2 brakemen were assigned to assist plaintiff; and that the
spotting was to be done during the lunch period at the
plant, which was 30 minutes. The evidence showed that
neither of the brakemen assigned to petitioner was experienced in that particular operation. There was evidence to the effect that the Ininimum time for completion
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of such operation was 50 minutes, and the 1naxi1nnln ""ell
over an hour; that on account of the above facts, it "~as
necessary for the plaintiff to work faster than normally;
and because of the inexperience of the brakemen, he had
to take a p·osition on top of the boxcars to be ready to
assist the brakemen; and that his norn1al position \Yould
have been on the ground. It \Vas stated by the court at
page 389:

'"We think it should have been left to the
jury to decide whether the respondent's direction
to complete the spotting operation within 30
minutes, plus the inexperience of the braken1en
assigned to perform this 'hot job,' Inight have
precipitated petitioner's injury. 'The debatable
quality' of that issue, the fact that fair-minded
men might reach different conclllSions, emphasize
the appropriateness of leaving the question to the
jury.' (citing Bailey)"
Fitzpatrick 1:. St. I.~ouis S. F. Ry. Co. (~Io.) 3:27 S.\\~.
2d 801. Suit for loss of an eye by braken1an, who had
duty of assisting conductor in "Tatehing for train order
signals and messages and on curves for hotboxes~ dragging brakes, etr. Plaintiff testifie.d that on August 17,
195-1-, he stuck his head out to look for a signal and got
a s"Ti rl of dust in his eye; and on the san1e run, "Thile
observing another signal, received another S\\irl of dust.
There \vas m·edical evidence that. this could ha Ye ~a used
the corneal ulcer which resulted in the loss of his eye.
The Supreine Court of l\Iissouri held that the e'Tidence
presented a jury question as to negligenee in not furnishing goggles under the hazardous conditions of dust .
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even though plaintiff testified that he had never worn
gogglPs and had never seen brakemen or conductors
"tearing them.
R.ingheiser v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 354 U.S. 901,

77 S. ( t. 1093, 1 L.Ed. 1268. Action by engineer for injuries ~ustained when he \Yent to a gondola car to answer
a call of nature, and the car \vas struck by another car
during switching operations, causing steel plates \Yith
"'"hich the gondola car was loaded to shift and crush the
engineer's leg. The lT.S. District Court of Ohio sustained
the railroad's motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict in favor of t·he engineer. The Court of Appeals affirined the judgment. The U.S. Supreme ·C~urt reversed'
the judgment of the lower courts, holding that whether
the railroad \vas or should have been aware of conditions
\v:hich ereated a likelihood that the engineer would' suffer
just such injury as he did \Vas a question for the jury.
1

Conner z:. Ru tle r, 361 1J.S. 29, 80 S. Ct. 21, -± L.Ed. 2d
10. Personal injnr~T action under FELA brought by
a hosecutter who \\'"a~ injured \Yhen the raised platform
floor or trapdoor in a passenger car fell on his hand as
he was inspecting the car prior to use. The District Court
of Appeals of Florida. rrhird District, sustained disinissal. The Supre1ne ( 1ourt of Florida affirmed without opinion, the Florida _A. ppellate eourt opinion being at 109
So. 2d 183; the Supre1ne (iourt action being at 113 So.
2d 835. The lJ.S. Supre1ne Court in a per euriam opinion
granted certiorari and reversed, citing the Rogers case.
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form floor to be defective, and he did not kno\\'" ho'v or
why the floor injured him.

Harris v. Pennsylvania RR Co., 361 U.S. 15, 80S. Ct.
22, 4 L.Ed. 2d 1. Action under FELA for injuries sustained by member of a ~',vreck train cre\v" 'vhen he slipped \vhile aiding in ret racking derailed cars. It 'vas held
that the evidence sustained a jury finding that the railroad ,,·as negligent in failing to use reasonable care to
provide the employee with a safe place to \vork, in that
he was required to 'vork on a crosstie which 'vas elevated
a substantial distance above the ground level and \vhich
\vas covered \vith grease or oil, affording an unstable
footing, and that the railroad's n·egligenee played a part
in producing the employee's injury. The only evidence
that there 'vas grease on the crosstie \\"'"as petitioner's
statement on cross exru11ination that he found son1e
grease on the sole of the shoe of his right foot, and the
testimony of the section foreman of the other railroad
that grease \vas used on that railroad's s\vitches, "~hich
\YPrP customarily lubricated at least t\\·ice a 'veek.

RR. CC _A_ :2d 1959~
267 F.2d 571. Action by a traclrn1an to recover for inlJunn 'r. Co1zenraugh & Black

I.~ick

juries sustained as a result of allegedl~· being required
to engage in heav~· physical labor too soon after surgery.
J udg1nent for the plaintiff \\·as appealed to the Circuit
(;ourt \vhich held that the evidence justified a finding
that defendant's negligence played a part in producing
the injuries for \\·hich da1na.g0~ 'vere a\varded to plaintiff. I 'rior to January, 1D:l:2, plaintiff had been en1ployed
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as a 1ne1nber of a H(~asey Jones crew" \vhieh carried
supplies to and from track repair gangs. This job involved lifting extrernely heavy rail~, \Yeighing at times
as mneh as a thousand pounds. In January, 1~)5~, plaintiff, then 36 years old, underwent an operation for chronic
ulcer~, requiring a gastric resection of % of his stomach.
T·he railroad doetor released the plaintiff for duty some
7 ".,.eeks after the operation. There \\'"as evidence tending
to sho\v that the heavy work plaintiff was required to perforin thereafter caused a ventral hernia. The Circuit
Court stated at page 575 :
"There \vas sufficient evidence adduced to
1nake it a jury question as to whether plaintiff had
been forced b~y defendant into work for which he
\vas unfitted by reason of his physical condition at
the time. Jt 1s settled that where '. . . management forced a sick employee, of \Vhose illness they
knew or should have kno,vn, into work for which
he \\ras unfitted because of his condition, a case
is 1nade out for the jury under the Federal Employers' Liability . .t\..ct.' Nuttall v. Reading Co.,
3 Cir. 1956, 235 F .~d 5+fi. 5-+9."
Bottrquet l\ .L4tchison, 1 .&S.F. Ry. Co. (N.M. 1959),
65 N.ni. 207, 3::3+ P.2d 1112. In this case the plaintiff suffered a hernia \\'"hile trying to pull in the side of a steel
coal car hy usP of a turnbuckle. Plaintiff and one other
man \\·er() assigned to this job; the other man had to stay
outside to use a burner to heat the side. There was testimony that 1t \\yas dangerous for only one 1nan to use the
turnbuckle; that this \Ya~ a 3-n1an job. There \vas also
1

evidence that the plaintiff had not requested additional
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ihelp, and evidence that the turnbuckle was rusty and
harder to use for tltat reason. The Supreme Court of
N e'v Mexico held that the evidence pre~sented a jury question as to negligence in failing to furnish adequate tools
or adequate assistance. ·The court cited the case of
Southern Ry. Co. v. Welch, 6th Cir. 1957, 247 P.2d 340,
as being a case \vith sirnilar facts, \vhere the plaintiff'~
\York \va~ to srnooth off sharp burrs from the end of
reclairned rails by grinding them with an emery \vheel;
that 200 rails were ground in one day, each weighing approximately 1600 pounds. Plaintiff was compelled to pull
the rails partly cross\vise of certain rollers supported by
tables 3 feet high, upon which the rails were carried to
be cut and ground. As a result of an injury to his back
during the pulling operation, plaintiff suffered a ruptured disc bet,veen the 4th and 5th vertebrae. In regard
to the issue as to \vhether or not defendant failed to
furnish adequate assistance, the defendant claimed that
this was a one-man job; but the court said that there \vas
substantial evidence that upon the day of the injury, circurnstances of p·articular difficulty existed; that the grit
grirne, tar, and dirt on the rails \Vere excessive and required additional force to pull the rails into proper
position; that under such circumstances, it had been the
practice to assign an extra 1nan to assist on the job, and
this \Yithout request. The court held that under this
evidence, the findings of the District Court \vere clearly
not e1rroneous and stated at page 341:
"The en1ployer is under the nondelegable
obligation of providing sufficient help for the
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partieular task. Chesapeak & Ohio Railway Con~
pauy v. Winder, 4 Cir. 23 F.2d 794. No duty required of the f!Hlployer for the safety and protection of his servants can be transferred so as to
exonerate him from such liability. 1\Torthern Pac£fic RR Co. v. ll erbert, 116 U. S. 64:2, G..t-7, 6 S:Ct.
590, 29 L.Ed. 755. In this case the Supreme Court
cited "~ith approval a decision of the ·Court of
~\ppeals of New York, !/like v. Boston & Albany
I~R Co., 53 N. Y. 5-t~J, \Yhich held the railroad
liable for an accident caused hy an insufficient
number of brakeman on the cars of the company
... vVhether the emplo~:er has failed to perform
his duty is a question of fact for the jury, ... "
The New ~fexico court felt that the facts in the Bourguet case were stronger for the plaintiff than the vVelch
case, and further relied heavily on the Blair case, supra,
and especially as to the rule of the Blair case requiring
the railroad conduct to be vie,ved as a wl1ole, considering
all of the elements of the task in question.
DU'TY TO SELECT AND INSTRUCT CREWS
The Second Circuit case of Palum v. The Lehigh
l"'alley RR Co., (19-±8) 165 F.2d 3, \vas a suit for personal
injury under FELA which occurred while plaintiff was
going over the coal car to c:heck a manhole for the amount
of \\~ater in the tank. Plaintiff was hit when the train
pa~sed under a lo\v bridge. On this particular run, plaintiff ,,·as part of a train crew on an inspection tour, and
the train \\·a~ proceedjng over a track with \Vhich he was
entirely unfarniliar, thi:-; being his first trip on said track.
..:\t a station \\,.here the unfamiliar track started, the engineer and other cre\vinen had been changed for the
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reason that they were unfamiliar with the track. The
court held that there was sufficient evidence to support
a jury verdict and stated at page 5 :
''It is possible that in former times it \\"'"ould
not have been regarded as negligent to embark
firemen upon such a service as that to \vhich the
plaintiff \Vas assigned but, under the recent rulings of the Supreme Court, \Ye cannot say that it
\Yas beyond reason for a jury to find that it \\'"as
negligent to send the plaintiff on an unfamiliar
route when firemen \vho were fan1iliar with that
route could apparently have geen obtained \vithout great difficulty. It \vould certainly have been
safer to send a firernan over the route " . .ho was
familiar with it and there \vas evidence indicating
that this safer method, if not invariably practiced,
,,. .as generally employed. In such circumstances
\Ve think it \\'"as required by the recent decisions
of the Supreme Court to leave to the jury the
question of whether that safer method should
not have been chosen...
"The jury evidently thought that there ought
to have been greater care exercised in selecting
the cre\\. . and that if Palum had not been sent over
a route ".,.hen he \vas unfamiliar \Yith the dangers
he might encounter he \vould not have be·en injured. \\T e cannot say that such a Yie"... \Yas
" . . ithout an~... substantial justification, and if not
it " . .as beyond judicial control however doubtful
rnigh t be its wisdom.''
In Cahi·ll v. New York, l\'eu· Haren, & Hartford RR
Co., CCA2d 1955, 22+ F.2d 637~ 350 U.S. 898~ 76 S. Ct.
180, 100 I.J. Ed. 790, the plaintiff \Yas injured "Thile flagging do\vn tra.ffie \\.,.hich \\. . as stopped behind a freight
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train proceeding \\'e~t on a street. This \\~as the first ti1ne
plaintiff had perfor1ned such duty, and he received no
instructions other than to hold the truck which was stopped behind the stovped train. vV.hen a trailer truck moved
past the side of the car \vith close clearance, the plaintiff
peeked around the side of the car to see whether the
trailer \\'"ould clear. As he turned back to\vard the truck,
it suddenly and without warning started up and struck
hi1n, throwing him against the projecting coupling of the
rear car. Plaintiff alleged failure to provide him with
a reasonably safe place to work and failure to instruct
and prepare him for the work assigned. The Circuit
c·ourt held as a matter of law that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a finding that the injury had been
the result of the railroad's failure to properly instruct
the brakeman or supervise his work, rather than neigligence of the truck driver. Judge Frank dissented, for the
reason that the jury could reasonably infer (1) that had
the defendant prop~erly instructed plaintiff, he would
have been so warned; and in the circumstances, he would
not have peeked around at the moving trailer truck but
would have remained face to face with the other truck;
and (2) that had he done so,

p~laintiff,

an able-bodied

1nan, aged 21, could and would have jumped out of harm's
\vay. Judge Frank stated at page 640:
"I assume, arguendo, that the inference
needed to support the verdict would not suffice
in a suit not brought under the Federal Employees' Liability Act. But the more recent
Supre1ne Court decisions make it clear that, under
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the Act, the jury's po,ver to dra'v inferences is
greater than in common-law actions."
Judge Frank also pointed out that his colleagues had
overlooked recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions showing a new attitude as of that time in FELA cases. The
U.S. Supreme Court at 350 lT.S. 898, 76 S. Ct. 180,
100 L. Ed. 790, on N overnber 21, 1955, in a p·er curian1
decision, granted certiorari and reversed the judg1nent of
the Second Circuit Court.
FORESEEABILITY
Defendant claims that the railroad should not have
foreseen such type of harm to plaintiff even though it
kept him in subfreezing temperatures for approxii11ateiy
12 hours continuously. In regard to the concept of foreseeability as laid down by the Supreme Court, see Lill£e
v. Thompson (1947), 332 U.S. 459, 68 S. Ct. 140, 92 L.
Ed. 73, where plaintiff, a 22-year-old 'von1an "~as required to work as a telegraph operator in a one-roon1
frame building in an isolated part of the yards of defendant, frequented· by dangerous characters, her shift
being from 11 :30 P.M. to 7 :30 A.~I. Plaintiff brought
suit under FELA for damages resulting fro1n a criminal
attack by an unknown assailant. The District Court
granted summary judgment for defendant, and the Circuit Court affirmed. '11 he lT.S. Supre1ne Court granted
certiorari and reversed, stating at p. 142:
HWe are of the opinion that the allegations
in the cornplaint, if supported b~~ evidence, 'viii
warrant sub1nission to a jury. Petitioner alleged in effect that re8pondent "~a8 a\\~are of
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eon eli tions which created a likelihood that a young
woman performing the duties required of petitioner "'ould suffer just such an injury as \\Tas in
fact inflicted upon her. That the foreseeable
danger was from intentional or criminal misconduct is irrelevant; respondent nevertheless had
a duty to make reasonable provision against it.
Breaeh of that duty would be negligence, and we
cannot say as a matter of law that petitioner's
injury did not result at least in part from such
negligence.''
.t\_lso see Rivera v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (N.l\J.
1956) 61 N.l\L 314, 299 P.2d 1090. Plaintiff, an extra
gang laborer, furnished board and sleeping quarters on
a \\Torktrain, attacked and injured by hoboes while visiting outdoor toilet after working hours. I-Ield: Evidence
warranted verdict for plaintiff on ground that railroad
company was negligent in failing to furnish plaintiff
a safe place to work.
Also see t·he case of Anderson v. Atchison, T. & S. F.
Ry. Co. (1948), 333 lT.S. 821, 68 S.Ct. 854, 92 L.Ed. 1108,
\\. . here the Supreme 'Court of California had held that
plaintiff would not have an actionable case unless he
could show that the railroad company kne\v that decedent
\Yas in a position \vhere he \vas unable to escape from the
exposure to cold ".,.eather. Thi~ \\Tas the case where the
conductor had disappeared fron1 the train and plaintiff
had alleged that his death \\Tas due to failure on the part
of the railroad company to promptly· and properly institute search. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding
that a jury could have found that decedent's exposure
1
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and deat'h were due 'in whole or in part' to failure of
defendant to do V\rhat a reasonable and prudent man
would ordinarily have done under the circumstances.
SUM~IARY

From the foregoing cases, it can be seen that the
U.S. Supreme Court "\\rill grant certiorari and reverse
any time a claimant offers proof "\Yhich justifies \\ith
reason the conclusion that e1nployer negligence played
any part, even the slightest, in producing his injury.
'}}he cases sho,v that in deter1nining this question, the eonduct of the railroad as a "·hole "\Yill be vie,ved as to
whether or not more could have been done to have provided plaintiff ,,·ith a safer place in "rhich to work, including the way in "\vhich the task "\vas done, the adequacy
of the help furnished, the tools furnished, etc.
The evidence in this case sho,vs that the railroad
required plaintiff to work in extremely cold "·eather
for approximately 12 hours continuously, "ith only an
inadequate fire for occasional 'varmth. There were adequate means 'vith 'vhich defendant could have reduced
the exposure by either furnishing a larger cre'v or using
the '' Dutclnnan" a~ it \Ya~ used on the night in question,
to postpone the job to daylight, at \vhich time it could
have been done rnuch n1ore quickly and p,robably in "·arn1er weather. The evidence even sho\\·s that the foreman
of the ere"·, \\·Pll lrnowing that plaintiff \\·as the only
1nember of the cre'v "·ho did not have overshoe~, sent
plaintiff through ~ to 10 inches of sno\\. . for approxiIna tely 300 yard:-; to get the truck: and this in vie"· of
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testi1nony hy Dr. Clegg that lo\\·ering a 1nan 's foot tenlperature \vill 111ake hi1n rnore easily prone to frostbite
of his fingers.
It \\·ill be remembered that any complaint \vhich
defendant n1akes as to plaintiff's own conduct in regard
to his injuries has no 1nerit in this case, inasn1uch as the
jury found that plaintiff was fifty per cent to blame and
accordingly cut J1is verdict in half. The only question
involved in this appeal is whether or not there is negligence \\'"hieh the jury could have found on the part of defendant ,,·hith played any part, even the slighte~t, in producing plaintiff's injuries. Certainly, in the framework
of the foregoing cases, there is no question about the
correetne~s of submitting this case to the jury.
POINT II
INSTRUCTION 3 CONTAINS NO REVERSIBLE ERROR

In defendant's Point II it first misstates that an
identical instruction to Instruction No.3 was given in the
case of J/ oore v. 1Jlle Denver & Rio Grande Western RR
Co., -! U.2d 235, 292 P.2d 849, and then proceeds to argue
against an instruction "chich \Vas not even given in the
case at bar, to wit, the assumption of risk instruction. The
instn1ction \Yhich was given in the nioore case is as follows:
·'That at the tirne of the occurrence involved
in this case, plaintiff, Alfred Roger nioore, and
defendant \Vere mutually engaged in interstate
commerce.
"' 1Jnder such circu1nstances the statutes of the
states of Utah and Colorado covering employers'
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liability and 'vorkmen's compensation are not
applicable to this case and plaintiff's rig·ht to recover, if any he has, is based solely on the statutes
of the United States covering the liability of common carriers by railroad to their employees for
injuries caused while in the course of their employment.''
Instruction No. 3 in the case at bar reads as follo"?s:
HAt the time plaintiff alleges that he "Ta~
injured, the defendant 'vas engaged as a common
carrier by railroad in interstate commerce and
plaintiff was employed by said defendant in such
interstate com1nerce, and plaintiff's injuries, if
any you so find, "Tere incurred while plaintiff and
defendant were mutually engaged in the conduct
of such interstate commerce.
You are further instructed that under such
c-ircumstances, plaintiff's sole and only right to
recover, if any he has, is based on the statutes of
the lTnited States covering the liability of eommon
carriers by railroad to their employees for injuries caused 'vhile in the course of their en1ployment.''
4

'

There have been only t'Yo cases lmo"'ll to plaintiff
which have discussed instructions even ren1otely similar
to the one in question here, Bruner t~. i.llcCa'rthy. (1943)
105 lT. 399, 142 P.2d 649, and the ~foore case, sup-ra. In
discussing the instruction involved in the Bruner case~
Justice Wolff stated as follows at page 412:
While Instruction 16, in which the jury
was told that the plaintiff was engaged at the
ti1ne of the accident in interstate commerce and
that the case was therefore governed by Federal
4 4
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rather than State la,v, may have been unnecessary in that the source of the law was not necessarily a concern of the jury, it could in no way
prejudice the defendants. The same is true of
Instruction 17 in "\vhich the court admonished
those jurors \\. ho have had previous trial experience in negligence cases to dispel from their
minds any and all concceptions that they may have
in respect to the law of negligence because this
case was governed by Federal law rather than
State law.''
This court in the Moore case discussed the instruction that was given in that ca8'e, which is different than
the one in the case at bar on page 260 :
·~ ..:\ ~iu1ilar

instruction to this was discussed
in the case of BrHner v. McCarthy, 105 U. 399,
l-t2 l).:2d 649, the court stating that the source of
the la\v \Vas not necessarily a concern of the jury.
The Bruner case also discussed an instruction of
the same iinport as Instruction 13 given in the
present case ... "
':J1he court then proceeded to discuss the instruction
on assuntpt.ion of risk, citing the case of Ellis v. [Jnion
Pacific R. Co., 148 Neb. 515, :27 ~.vV. 2d 921, 329 U.S. 649,
67 S. Ct. 598, 91 L.Ed. 572, \vhich dealt exclusively ,,. ith
the assun1ption of risk instruction. The Court went on to
hold that it \vas unnecessary to determine whether the
giving of these instructions constituted reversible error,
since the case \Va8 reversed on other grounds. Justice
Crockett dissented in this aspect of the 1\Ioore case, his
opinion dealing "Tith the que8tion of \vhether or not the
t". o instructions constituted prejudicial error. l-Ie felt that
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there was no prejudicial error in these instructions, and
that they ,,,.ere certainly not idle dissertations on principles of law entirely foreign to the issues v.rhich were
tried and that they correctly stated the basis of liability.
In regard to Instruction No. 12, he stated at page 265:
"No. 12 directs the jury not to consider the
matter of Workmen's Compensation with 'vhich
every person of common sense is nov.r acquainted,
and \\""hich there may be reasonable apprehension
that lay jurors' minds might consider. It should
not be regarded as error that the trial court
\Yarned them not to do so.
''Courts habitually give cautionary instructions as v.ras done in this case. Instruction No. 20
told the jury that the defendant was not an insurer of the safety of its employees. No such
issue had been raised and it may be argued that
the instruction was unnecessary. However, it is
invariably requested by the defendant in such
cases, and is usually given. It falls in the same
category as the two instructions discussed in the
main opinion. It does no harm as a precaution
and does not misstate the law."
Instruction No. 3 does not even state that \\T orkmen 's Co1npensation la\\,.s do not apply, as "~as complained of in the l\Ioore case, but merely states that the source
of the la\\c is the United States Statutes covering the
liability of comn1on carriers by railroad; and that if
plaintiff has a right to recover, his sole and only right
is pursuant to these statutes. Certainly tlris instruction
does no u1ore t;han to tell the jury to follow the eourt's
instructions on the la\\T in this case and to discard any
notions of their O\\·n, \\'"hich is customarilY
. done in every.
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ease. If there is any prejudice to the defendant by reason of Instruction ~ o. :~, certainly" defendant should tell
us what it is. DefPndant has not specified just how it
was prejudiced b~r the giving of this instruction. Defendant has presented its entire argument as to how t;he
ass1unption of risk instruction \vas prejudicial, and this
illstruction u·a.s not even given in this case. Therefore, the
authorities "Thich defendant cited-Sici:Z-iano v. The Denrer aud Rio Grande Wester·n Railroad Co., 12 U.2d 183,
364 l>.2d -l-13, and the l~llis case, supra-are not in point,
inasn1uch as they relate solely to the assmnp·tion of risk
instruction. The very least that defendant could do if
it desires to take up the time of this court with such an
argun1ent as made in its Point II is to tell the court how
the instruction prejudiced it and to cite some authority
for that proposition. This, the defendant has failed to
do.
In connection with this point, a recent U. S. Supreme
Court case is l1elp.ful, H. T. Arnold v. Pan Handle & Santa
Fe Ry. Co. (1957), 353 U.S. 360, 77 S. Ct. 840, 1 L. Ed.
889. In this case, pursuant to Texas procedure, the trial
court required the jury to bring in a general verdict on
the issue of negligence, and also to make findings on
special issues put to it by the court. The general verdict
was favorable to petitioner, but the findings on the special issues were in favor of the respondent, and were
inconsistent with the general verdict. The State Appellate Court, applying Texas law, held that the general
verdict must yield to the inconsistent findings on the special issues, and that the trial court should have entered
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judgment for the respondent. In a per curiam opinion,
the court stated at page 841:
~~The

petitioner having asserted federal
right~ governed by federal la'"·, it is our duty
under the Act to make certain that they are fully
protected, as the Congress intended them to be.
We therE\fore cannot accept interpretations that
nullify their effectiveness, for ' ... the assertion
of Federal rights, when plainly and reasonably
1r4ade, is n,.ot to be defeated under the na.me of
local practice.'·'
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL
ERRO·R IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 16.

Defendant in its Point III, in 'vhat may be interpreted to be desperation, clai1ns that someho"r the. trial
court inserted racial prejudice into this case in Instruction 16. Such a contention is utterly ridiculous. Ho"r defendant can "\Yarp the "Tord ''type'' into anything having
to do "\Yith racial prejudice seems beyond the imagination.
Certainly no jury can be accused of engaging in such
imaginative thinking as has gone into defendant's Point
III.
The evidence produced in the case legitimately raised
a question as to whether or not defendant should ,have
provided a larger c.re\Y so that the tin1e of exposure to
the elements 'vould have been reduced and the time available to warm at the fire increased. Plaintiff testified
that a larger c.rew would have reduced his exposure. The
court properly instructed that the railroad had the duty
of cxPr<'i~ing rPaHonable care in providing cre\\Ts. This
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c.an be the only interpretation of the 1neaning of Instruction No. 16, and ~uch a consideration is in keeping \vith
the cases cited herein dealing \vith this duty on the part
of the railroad co1npany. See Davis v. l.,..irginian Raillcay Co.; Blair v. Balt·itnore & Ohio RR Co.; Bourquet v.
Atchison, 1 & S. F. Ry. Co.; Southern Ry. Co. v. Welch;
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. TVinder; n" orthern Pacific
RR Co. v. llcrbert; Flike v. Boston & Albany RR Co.;
Palum v. Lehigh 1'alley RR Co.; Dunn v. Conenlaugh
and Black Lick RR.; Cahill v. Neu) York, New Haven &
Hartford RR Co.; (all cited supra).
7

•

The follo\ving language in th·e Blair case is worthy
of repetition:
'~'The

nature of the duty which the petitioner
\\~as commanded to undertake, the dangers of moving a greased, 1000 lb. steel tube, 30 feet in length,
on a 5 foot truck, the area over \vhich that truck
"'"as con1pelled to be moved, the suitableness of
the tools used in an extraordinary manner to
acco1nplish a novel purpose, the number of men
n.ssig ned to assist hint, the.ir experience in such
work and their ability to perform the duties and
tlze 1nan ner in which they performed those duties
- all of these raised questions ap·propriate for
a jury to appraise in considering whether or not
the injury \vas the result of negligence as alleged
in the ro1nplaint.''
It is respectfully submitted that there could be no
prejudicial error contained in Instruction No. 16. CertainlY. such overlv
. refined and imaginative thinking as
has been indulged in by defendant in this point would
make it so that there could never be a set of instructions
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given by a trial judge without some kind of error.
The following language from Judge Crockett's opinion in the Moore case, supra, is appropriate, page 265 :
'~It is of the greatest practical importance for
the efficient and sensible administration of justice
that we give more than lip service to our rules
and our judicial pronouncements that technical
errors should be disregarded, and that a judgment should not be vacated unless there is error
\vhich is substantial and prejudicial, and that a
new trial should only be granted when there is
a reasonable likelihood that, in the absence of
error, there would be a different result.''

P·OIN'T IV
THE AWARD BY THE JURY WAS NOT EXCESSIVE

D:efendant in its Point \,.I complains for the first
time that the an1ount of the a\\~ard "-ras excessive. It
should be emphasized that this is the first time this point
has been raised. At the time of the verdict, and shortly
thereafter, defendant \Yas not so shocked by the amount
that it made any complaint. The only conclusion "~e can
draw is that this is one n1ore desperate effort by defendant to thro\v anything it ran into the hopper. It "~11 be
recalled that prior to the incident in question, plaintiff
had lost the middle finger of his left hand. The loss of
the two additional fingers left plaintiff \Yith nothing
more than a forefinger and a thun1b. Dr. Clegg testified
that the loss of the t\vo additional fingers gaYP hi1n an
additional disabilit~~ of 25 per cent over and above \vhat
he had prior to the injury. l~laintiff is a. 55-year-old
laboring 1nan \\·ith no skills other than the use of his
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hand~.

An injury that reduces his left hand to nothing

but a prong of a forefinger and a thumb is a substantial
injury to such a rnan. In all good common sense, it cannot
earnestly be asserted that such an award \vas one given
under the influence of passion and prejudice.

The trial court submitted this case to the jury under
correct instructions. Defendant had its day in Court. Its
argument that it had no duty toward protecting its employees fro1n such excpssive and

e~xtreme E~xposure

as hap-

pened in this case was rep·udiated by the jury. The. jury
did not approve such an attitude of callousness toward
its employes as vvas exhibited by defendant in the case
at bar. This verdict was in keeping with the humanitarian
purpose of t,he Federal Employers' Liability Act and with
the recent cases which have vigilantly and zealously protected the

ri~ght

to a jury trial in keeping vvith the intent

of Congress in the passage of the Act. The U. S. Supreme
Court is constantly guarding against ''the kind of luisconception .evident in the opinion belo,,~ \Vhich fails to
take into account the special

feature~

of

thi~

statutory

negligence action and make it signifieantly different from
the ordinary common-law negligence action."
FELA cases must be considered separately and apart
from ordinary negligence cases, as has been stated tirne
and again by the

(T.

S. Supreme Court and lesser courts
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in obedience to it. It is submitted that these recent strong
pronouncements are conspicuously absent from the brief
submitted by defendant. In keeping with them, the judgment on the jury's verdict in this case must be affinned.
Respectfully submitted,

RAWLINGS, WALLACE
ROBERTS & BLACK
~JOHN L. BLACK
Attorneys for Respondent
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